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Abstract
Corporations are retaining ever-larger corpuses of personal
data; the frequency or breaches and corresponding privacy
impact have been rising accordingly. One way to mitigate
this risk is through use of anonymized data, limiting the
exposure of individual data to only where it is absolutely
needed. This would seem particularly appropriate for data
mining, where the goal is generalizable knowledge rather
than data on specific individuals. In practice, corporate
data miners often insist on original data, for fear that they
might ”miss something” with anonymized or differentially
private approaches. This paper provides a theoretical
justification for the use of anonymized data. Specifically, we
show that a support vector classifier trained on anatomized
data satisfying `-diversity should be expected to do as
well as on the original data. Anatomy preserves all data
values, but introduces uncertainty in the mapping between
identifying and sensitive values, thus satisfying `-diversity.
The theoretical effectiveness of the proposed approach is
validated using several publicly available datasets, showing
that we outperform the state of the art for support vector
classification using training data protected by k-anonymity,
and are comparable to learning on the original data.
1 Introduction
Many privacy definitions have been proposed based
on generalizing/suppressing data (`-diversity[23], k-
anonymity [27, 28], t-closeness [19], δ-presence [25],
(α,k)-anonymity [32]). Other alternatives include value
swapping [24], distortion [2], randomization [12], and
noise addition (e.g., differential privacy [11]). Gener-
alization consists of replacing identifying attribute val-
ues with a less specific version [28]. Suppression can
be viewed as the ultimate generalization, replacing the
identifying value with an “any” value [28]. Generaliza-
tion has the advantage of preserving truth, but a less
specific truth that reduces utility of the published data.
Xiao and Tao proposed anatomization as a method
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to enforce `-diversity while preserving specific data
values [33]. Anatomization splits instances across two
tables, one containing identifying information and the
other containing private information. The more general
approach of fragmentation [7] divides a given dataset’s
attributes into two sets of attributes (2 partitions)
such that an encryption mechanism avoids associations
between two different small partitions. Vimercati et
al. extend fragmentation to multiple partitions [9], and
Tamas et al. propose an extension that deals with
multiple sensitive attributes [13]. The main advantage
of anatomization/fragmentation is that it preserves the
original values of data; the uncertainty is only in the
mapping between individuals and sensitive values.
We show that this additional information has real
value. First, we demonstrate that in theory, learning
from anatomized data can be as good as learning from
the raw data. We then demonstrate empirically that
learning from anatomized data beats learning from
generalization-based anonymization.
This paper looks at linear support vector (SVC) and
support vector machine (SVM) classifiers. This focus
was chosen because these classifiers have a wide range
of successful applications, and also have some solid
theoretical basis their generalization properties. We
propose a simple heuristic to preprocess the anatomized
data such that SVC and SVM generalize well with
sufficiently large training data.
There is concern that anatomization is vulnerable
to several attacks [18, 14, 21]. While this can be
an issue, any method that provides meaningful utility
fails to provide perfect privacy against a sufficiently
strong adversary [20, 11]. Introducing uncertainty into
the anonymization process reduces the risk of many
attacks, e.g., minimality [31, 8]. Our theoretical analysis
holds for any assignment of items to anatomy groups,
including a random assignment, which provides a high
degree of robustness against minimality and correlation-
based attacks. While this does not eliminate privacy
risk, if the alternative is to use the original data, we
show that anatomy provides comparable utility while
reducing the privacy risk. This paper has the following
key contributions:
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1. We define a classification task on anatomized data
without violating the random worlds assumption.
A violating classification task would be the predic-
tion of sensitive attribute, a task that was found to
be #P-complete by Kifer [18].
2. We propose a heuristic algorithm to train SVC and
SVM when the test data is neither anonymized nor
anatomized. Inan et al. already gives a practical
applications of such a learning scenario [15].
3. We study the effect of our heuristic algorithm on
the generalization error. To our best knowledge,
this is the first paper in the privacy community
that does such analysis for `-diversity
4. In empirical analysis, our algorithm will be com-
pared with SVM and SVC that are trained on ei-
ther unprotected data or generalized data (under
k-anonymity [15]). The analysis will be justified
with the statistical learning theory [29, 5]
We next summarize related work and define the
problem statement. We then give necessary definitions
and notations. Section 4 proposes the heuristic algo-
rithm and gives theoretical analysis. Empirical analysis
is presented in section 5. Section 6 summarizes the work
and gives future directions.
2 Related Work and Problem Statement
There have been studies of linear classification for
anonymized data. Agrawal et al. proposed an itera-
tive distribution reconstruction algorithm for distorted
training data from which a C4.5 decision tree classi-
fier was trained [1]. Iyengar suggested using a classi-
fication metric so as to find the optimum generaliza-
tion. Then, a C4.5 decision tree classifier was trained
from the optimally generalized training data [16]. Dowd
et al. studied C4.5 decision tree learning from train-
ing data perturbed by random substitutions. A matrix
based distribution reconstruction algorithm was applied
on the perturbed training data from which an accu-
rate C4.5 decision tree classifier was learned [10]. Inan
et al. proposed support vector machine classifiers us-
ing anonymized training data that satisfy k-anonymity.
Taylor approximation was used to estimate the linear
and RBF kernel computation from generalized data[15].
Rubinstein et al. studies the kernels of support vector
machine in the differential privacy and show the trade-
off between privacy level and the data utility. They ana-
lyze finite and infinite dimensional kernels in function of
the approximation error under differential privacy [26].
Lin at al. studies training support vector classification
for outsourced data. Random transformation is applied
on the training set so that the cloud server computes
the accurate model without knowing what the actual
values are [22]. Jain et al. studies the support vec-
tor machine kernels in the differential privacy setting.
They propose differentially private mechanisms to train
support vector machines for interactive, semi-interactive
and non-interactive learning scenarios, providing theo-
retical analysis of the proposed approaches [17].
None of the earlier work has provided a linear clas-
sifier directly applicable to anatomized training data.
Such a classifier requires specific theoretical and experi-
mental analysis, because anatomized training data pro-
vides additional detail that has the potential to improve
learning; but also additional uncertainty that must be
dealt with. Furthermore, most of the previous work
didn’t justify theoretically why the proposed heuristics
let classifiers generalize well. Therefore, this paper stud-
ies the following problem: Define a heuristic to train
SVCs and SVMs on anatomized data without violating
`-diversity while using the sensitive information, with a
theoretical guarantee of good generalization under rea-
sonable assumptions.
3 Definitions and Notations
The first four definitions restate standard definitions of
unprotected data and attribute types.
Definition 1. A dataset D is called a person specific
dataset for population P if each instance Xi ∈ D belongs
to a unique individual p ∈ P .
The person specific dataset will be called the orig-
inal training data in this paper. Next, we will give the
first type of attributes.
Definition 2. A set of attributes are called direct
identifying attributes if they let an adversary associate
an instance Xi ∈ D to a unique individual p ∈ P without
any background knowledge.
Definition 3. A set of attributes are called quasi-
identifying attributes if there is background knowledge
available to the adversary that associates the quasi-
identifying attributes with a unique individual p ∈ P .
We include both direct and quasi-identifying at-
tributes under the name identifying attribute. First
name, last name and social security number (SSN) are
common examples of direct identifying attributes. Some
common examples of quasi-identifying attributes are
age, postal code, and occupation. Next, we will give
the second type of attribute.
Definition 4. An attribute of instance Xi ∈ D is
called a sensitive attribute if we should protect against
adversaries correctly inferring the value for an individ-
ual.
Patient disease and individual income are common
examples of sensitive attributes. Unique individuals
p ∈ P typically don’t want these sensitive information
to be revealed to individuals without a direct need to
know that information. Provided an instance Xi ∈ D,
the class label is denoted by Xi.C. We don’t consider
the case where C is sensitive, as this would make the
purpose of classification to violate privacy. C is neither
sensitive nor identifying in this paper, although our
analysis holds for C being an identifying attribute.
Given the former definitions, we will next define the
anonymized training data following the definition of k-
anonymity [28].
Definition 5. A training dataset D that satisfies the
following conditions is said to be anonymized training
data Dk [28]:
1. The training data Dk does not contain any unique
identifying attributes.
2. Every instance Xi ∈ Dk is indistinguishable from
at least (k − 1) other instances in Dk with respect
to its quasi-identifying attributes.
Anatomy satisfies a slightly weaker definition; the indis-
tinguishability applies only to sensitive data. This will
be captured in Definitions 8-15.
In this paper, we assume that the anonymized
training data Dk is created according to a generalization
based data publishing method. We next define the
comparison classifiers.
Definition 6. A linear support vector classifier (SVC)
that is trained on the anonymized training data Dk is
called the anonymized SVC. Similarly, a support vector
machine (SVM) that is trained on the anonymized
training data Dk is called the anonymized SVM.
Definition 7. A linear support vector classifier (SVC)
that is trained on the original training data D is called
the original SVC. Similarly, a support vector machine
(SVM) that is trained on the original training data D is
called the original SVM.
The theoretical aspects of comparison classifiers
are out of the scope of this paper. We will remind
the theoretical analysis of the original SVC and SVM
classifiers in the end of this section [29].
We go further from Definition 5, requiring that
there must be multiple possible sensitive values that
could be linked to an individual. The proposed
algorithms will be centered around the following
definitions. This new requirement uses the definition
of groups [23].
Definition 8. A group Gj is a subset of instances
in original training data D such that D = ∪mj=1Gj,
and for any pair (Gj1 , Gj2) where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ m,
Gj1 ∩Gj2 = ∅.
Next, we define the concept of `-diversity or `-
diverse (multiple possible sensitive values) for all the
groups in the original training data D.
Definition 9. A set of groups is said to be
`-diverse if and only if for all groups Gj
∀v ∈ ΠAs(Gj), freq(v,Gj)|Gj | ≤ 1` where As is the sen-
sitive attribute in D, ΠAs(∗) is the database As
projection operation on original training data ∗ (or on
data table in the database community), freq(v,Gj) is
the frequency of v in Gj and |Gj | is the number of
instances in Gj.
We extend the data publishing method anatomiza-
tion that is originally based on `-diverse groups by Xiao
et al. [33].
Definition 10. Given an original training data D par-
titioned in m `-diverse groups according to Definition 9,
anatomization produces an identifying table IT and a
sensitive table ST as follows. IT has schema
(C,A1, ..., Ad, GID)
including the class attribute, the quasi-identifying at-
tributes Ai ∈ IT for 1 ≤ i ≤ d, and the group id GID of
the group Gj. For each group Gj ∈ D and each instance
Xi ∈ Gj, IT has an instance Xi of the form:
(Xi.C,Xi.A1, ..., Xi.Ad, j)
ST has schema
(GID,As)
where As is the sensitive attribute in D and GID is the
group id of the group Gj. For each group Gj ∈ D and
each instance Xi ∈ Gj, ST has an instance of the form:
(j,Xi.As)
The IT table includes only the quasi-identifying
and class attributes. We assume that direct identifying
attributes are removed before creating the IT and
ST tables. We have the following observation from
Definition 10 to train a classifier: every instance Xi ∈
IT can be matched to ` instances Xj ∈ ST using
the common attribute GID in both data table. This
observation yields the anatomized training data.
Definition 11. Given two data tables IT and ST
resulting from the anatomization on original training
data D, the anatomized training data DA is
DA = ΠIT.A1,···IT.Ad,ST.As( IT 1 ST )
where 1 is the database inner join operation with respect
to the condition IT.GID = ST.GID and Π(∗) is the
database projection operation on training data *.
Anatomized training data shows one of the most
na¨ıve data preprocessing approaches. Another one is
ignoring the sensitive attribute in ST table.
Definition 12. Given two data tables IT and ST
resulting from the anatomization on original training
data D, the identifying training data Did is
Did = ΠIT.A1,···IT.Ad( IT )
where Π(∗) is the database projection operation on
training data *.
The na¨ıve training method of Defintion 11 is both
costly (a factor of ` increase in size) and noisy: for every
true instance, there are ` − 1 incorrect instances that
may not be linearly separable. Ignoring the sensitive
data, on the other hand, does not use all the information
available in the published data (and would likely lead
to users insisting on having the original data.) A
smarter preprocessing algorithm would eliminate ` − 1
instances within each group such that the training data
becomes separable having good generalization (with or
without soft margin). This gives the definition of our
proposition: pruned training data.
Definition 13. Given two data tables IT and ST
resulting from anatomization of the original training
data D, the pruned training data DP is
DP = ΠIT.A1,···IT.Ad,ST.As(σG( IT, ST ))
where σG(IT, ST ) is a pruning mechanism eliminating
`− 1 instances for all groups G in the IT/ST pair that
are unlikely to be separable (cf. Section 4), and Π(∗) is
the database projection operation on training data *.
Definition 14. A linear support vector classifier
(SVC) that is trained on the identifying training data
Did is called the identifying SVC. Similarly, a support
vector machine (SVM) that is trained on the identifying
training data Did is called the identifying SVM.
Definition 15. A linear support vector classifier
(SVC) that is trained on the pruned training data DP
is called the pruned SVC. Similarly, a support vector
machine (SVM) that is trained on the pruned training
data DP is called the pruned SVM.
Now, we are giving the notations of this paper. Xi
will denote a training instance in the original training
data D and pruned training data DP interchangeably.
N will be the total number of instances in D and
DP . X will be a random variable vector in D and DP
interchangeably. D ⊂ Rd+1 and DP ⊂ Rd+1 will hold
in Euclidean space (see Appendix for practical issues).
y will be the binary class label with values {−1, 1}.
f(X) = wX + b will be a linear classifier such that
w ∈ Rd+1 and b ∈ R. F is the functional space
(3.1)
{f : Rd+1 → {0, 1} : f(X) = wX + b, b ∈ R, w ∈ Rd+1}.
We will use f instead of f(X) for shorthand in subse-
quent parts of this paper. The risk of a linear classifier
f is R(f) in (3.2).
(3.2) R(f) =
∫
|(y − f(X))|p(X, y)dXdy
In (3.2), p(X, y) is the joint probability density of
training instances X with class label y. The empirical
risk of classifier f is R̂N (f) in (3.3).
(3.3) R̂N (f) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(y 6= f(Xi))
In (3.3), N is the number of training instances and I(∗)
is the indicator function. The linear classifier f is an
empirical risk minimizer such that f̂N = argmin
f∈F
R̂N (f).
Given the empirical risk minimizer f̂N is the SVC with
the largest margin, bound (3.4) holds
(3.4) E[R(f̂N )] ≤ E[(R||w||)
2]
N
when the training data is linearly separable [5]. In
(3.4), R stands for the radius of the sphere that the
shatterable instances lie on and w stands for the weight
vector of hyperplane f(X) in (3.1). For the same SVC,
the generalization ability is defined in (3.5) according to
VC theory [29, 5].
(3.5)
E[R(f̂N )]− inf
f∈F
R(f) ≤ 4
√
(d+ 2)log(N + 1) + log2
N
In (3.5), inf
f∈F
R(f) is the minimum possible risk for the
SVC f . Next, we define our pruning mechanism for the
anatomization.
4 Pruning Mechanism for Anatomization
4.1 Algorithm We will explain our algorithm (σG
in Definition 13) through the example in Figure 1. The
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(b) Noisy Training Data (Aid = A1, AS = A2, ` = 2)
Figure 1: Toy Example of Training Data with Two Attributes A1 and A2
.
curious reader should visit Figures B.1 and B.2 in the
appendix to see the pseudo code and the complex-
ity. Although the example is for any linear classifier
(hyperplane), the pruning mechanism is valid for SVC
and SVM. We later define the generalization ability of
pruned SVC/SVM (cf. Definition 15).
Figure 1a shows the original training data with six
instances: two instances of a blue class (on the left
side) and four of a red class (on the right side), with
two attributes A1 and A2. Here, every instance has a
different shape and filling combination since they are
unique. Figure 1b shows the anatomized training data
with 12 instances created from pairs IT (A1, GID) and
ST (GID,A2) when ` = 2 (cf. Definitions 10 and 11).
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Figure 2: Linear Classifier from Original Training Data
A typical training procedure would be the subtrac-
tion of mean from attributes A1 and A2 in the original
training data, and solving an objective function of a
perceptron or SVC (cf. Figure 2). In Figure 2, the orig-
inal training data is linearly separable and the instances
which are closest to the separating hyperplane lie on the
surface of the circle 1. This circle is the key point of lin-
ear classification, because the original training data is
guaranteed to be linearly separable if the instances that
1The discussion can be generalized to sphere for 3 or larger
dimensions. See Burges [5] and Vapnik [29] for general discussion.
are closest to the decision boundary lie on the surface
of a circle [5]. This observation let us define two steps
of the pruning mechanism algorithm:
1. Prerequisite Step: Estimate the circle of shatter-
able instances from the anatomized training data
(Algorithm in Figure B.1).
2. Pruning Step: For every group in the anatomized
training data, pick an instance that is closest to
the surface of the estimated circle of shatterable
instances (Algorithm in Figure B.2).
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Figure 3: Possible Circles of Shatterable Points
Figure 3 show the range of radiuses for all possible
circles of shatterable instances in the prerequisite step.
The radius of the original training data must be between
the norms of the pair of instances that are closest to
(rAmin in Figure 3) and farthest from (rAmax in Figure
3), the origin. Under the random worlds assumption
[33], the prerequisite step assumes that (rAmin, rAmax)
has uniform distribution and therefore estimates the
expected radius E[r] with rAmin+rAmax2 (dashed green
line in Figure 3).
Using the estimated radius from the prerequisite
step, the pruning step creates the pruned training data
in Figure 4. Figure 4 also has the hyperplane that is
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Figure 4: Linear Classifier from Pruned Training Data
trained from the pruned training data. Although the
shatterable instances of the pruned training data (cf.
Figure 4) are the same as the shatterable instances of
the original training data (cf. Figure 2), other instances
are different. The purpose of the pruning step is to
find a linearly separable case instead of distribution
reconstruction.
There are two remaining issues to address. First
is the application of the pruning algorithm even if
the anatomized training data is linearly separable (cf.
Figure 1b). Even though the anatomized training
data is linearly separable in this case, it is not always
guaranteed. The instances within each group are not
linearly independent from the other `− 1 instances and
the shattering property is damaged [5]. The second
issue is non-separable original and anatomized training
data. If the training data is not linearly separable in the
original (d + 1) dimensional space, the right approach
would be projecting it into higher dimensional space,
apply the pruning algorithm in the projected space and
hope for the best with a soft margin classifier.
4.2 Privacy Preservation The preprocessing and
pruning steps preserve the `-diversity condition of anat-
omization. The algorithm doesn’t estimate the correct
matchings between the identifying and the sensitive ta-
bles. Instead, it makes a random guess within each
group which is expected to give some linearly separable
training data. It is possible that the original training
data isn’t linearly separable or even is a random set of
instances without any pattern (see Section 5).
4.3 Generalization Error of Pruned SVC We
will now give the upper bound on the generalization
error of the pruned SVC (cf. Definition 15).
Theorem 4.1. Let N be the number of instances, d be
the number of identifying attributes and d + 1 be the
total number of attributes in the original and the pruned
training data. Let R be the radius of sphere containing
the shatterable instances of the original training data D
and w be the weights of the linear hyperplane resulting
from linear SV classifier trained on the original training
data D. Let Rp and wp be the symmetric notations for a
linear SV classifier trained on the pruned training data
Dp. Assume that all the training instances are located
in an Euclidean space Rd+1. Let || ∗ || be the Euclidean
norm of vector ∗. Let r2 be (R||w||)2, r2p be (RP ||wp||)2,
[r2p]min be min{r2p} > 0 and [r2p]max be max{r2p} < ∞.
Let R̂N (f) be the empirical risk of on the original
training data D and R̂Np(f) be the empirical risk on
the pruned training data. Let F be the functional space
defining the set of possible linear SV classifiers on the
original training data D and Fp be the functional space
of possible linear SV classifiers on the pruned training
data DP . Let f̂N be the empirical risk minimizer such
that f̂N = argmin
f∈F
R̂N (f) and f̂Np be the empirical risk
minimizer such that f̂Np = argmin
f∈Fp
R̂Np(f) Last, let
inf
f∈F
R(f) be the lowest value of the risk of the linear SV
classifier f that could be analytically calculated. Then,
the expected risk E[R(f̂Np)] of f̂Np converges to inf
f∈F
R(f)
under the upper bound
E[R(f̂Np)]− inf
f∈F
R(f) ≤ 4
√
(d+ 2)log(N + 1) + log2
N
+
[r2p]max − [r2p]min
N
(4.6)
using only DP .
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is provided in Appendix
Section A. The upper bound (4.6) is defined as the
function of two terms where the second term is the
result of using pruned training data. The former upper
bound shows that pruned SVC can be as accurate as
the original SVC under two conditions: 1) Very large
training data size (N → ∞) 2) Small size of
sensitive attribute domain or low ` value or both
([r2p]max − [r2p]min → 0).
Theorem 4.1 holds when the pruned training data is
mapped into a higher dimensional space d′ using kernel
trick. Although the generalization ability of SVMs with
RBF kernel is not formally defined (invalid Theorem
4.1), SVMs with RBF kernel are expected to work under
the conditions of Theorem 4.1 in the infinite dimensional
space [29, 5].
5 Experiments
5.1 Prerequisites
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Figure 5: SVC on Adult
5.1.1 Datasets We tested our algorithm on the
adult, IPUMS and marketing datasets of the UCI data
repository [4] and the fatality dataset of Keel data
repository [3]:
1. Adult: Adult dataset is drawn from 1994 census
data of the United States [4]. It is composed of
45222 instances after the removal of instances with
missing values. The binary classification task is to
predict whether a person’s adjusted gross income
is ≤ 50K or > 50K. The attribute “final weight”
is ignored. Last, education was treated as sensitive
attribute in the experiments.
2. IPUMS: This data is drawn from the 1970, 1980
and 1990 census data of the Los Angeles and Long
Beach areas [4]. It has 233584 instances in total.
We picked the 10 attributes that are included in
the adult data. The binary classification task is to
predict whether a person’s total income is ≤ 50K
or > 50K. The classifiers are expected to show a
different behavior from the former adult data since
the population (and to some extent, classification
task, as it is total income rather than adjusted gross
income) are different. Last, education was treated
as sensitive attribute in the experiments.
The additional information is provided in the ap-
pendix for marketing and fatality datasets. Weka was
used for attribute selection and discretization if needed
[30].
5.1.2 Privacy Setup The anatomization was done
according to Xiao et al.’s bucketization algorithm [33].
When `-diversity condition is not satisfied, the instances
were divided into groups of size ` according to the
original bucketization algorithm. Leftover instances
were suppressed (not used in training models).
Org. L=2 L=3 L=4 L=5 Id.
0.
10
0
0.
10
5
0.
11
0
0.
11
5
0.
12
0
IPUMS Data Linear SV
Classifier Type
Er
ro
r R
at
e
Figure 6: SVC on IPUMS
Anonymized training data was created for the adult
dataset. We used Inan et al.’s value generalization
hierarchies in the experiments. The privacy parameters
were k = ` for k-anonymity and `-diversity to compare
the classifiers using same group sizes in training data.
Anonymized and anatomized training data had
the same identifying and sensitive attributes. The
sensitive attributes were chosen such that the `-diversity
is satisfied for at least ` = 2.
5.1.3 Model Evaluation Setup LibSVM version
3.21 was used for the support vector classification [6].
We will train the support vector machine with linear
(SVC) and RBF kernels (SVM).
10-fold cross validation was used for evaluation.
The comparison includes pruned SVC/SVM, original
SVC/SVM and identifying SVC/SVM. The comparison
on adult dataset also include anonymized SVC/SVM.
The anonymized SVC/SVM are not included for other
datasets since Inan et al. provided generalization
hierarchies only in the adult dataset [15]. Last, the error
rates of pruned and original SVC/SVM are compared
using the Student t-test (See Appendix). Other models
are not included, because Theorem 4.1 covers only
pruned and original SVC/SVM.
5.2 Analysis of Results Figures 5, 6 (see above)
and C.1 through C.8 (see Appendix) show the boxplots
of error rates for SVC and SVM. In all Figures, “Org.”
and “Id.” labels will stand for original SVC/SVM
and identifying SVC/SVM respectively. The pruned
and anonymized SVC/SVM will be represented by their
respective privacy parameters (L for ` and k for k.) This
section will include the discussion of results in Figures
5 and 6. (See Appendix for analysis of other results.)
The analysis have three observation aspects.
The first is the comparison between the pruned and
the original SVC/SVM. From Theorem 4.1, we expect
that the average error rate of the pruned SVC/SVM
will be higher than the average error rate of the original
SVC/SVM because bound (4.6) has the additional
second term at the right-hand side (cf. Section 4.3).
Increasing the ` parameter would result in the increase
of the average error rate if the training data size remains
same between multiple ` values (no suppression). The
rate of the error rate increase in function of ` is
theoretically hard to estimate since the assignments
of sensitive attributes to each group will be random
throughout the bucketization algorithm [33]. Figure
6 show the expected behaviour for the pruned SVC.
The average error rates in Figure 5 show a surprising
result. We observe that the pruned SVC outperforms
the original SVC for multiple ` values. Moreover, the
average error rate decreases when ` is increased. Here,
the assumption of Theorem 4.1 is violated because of
suppression for ` ≥ 4. The bound 4.6 thus does not
hold and the result is statistically insignificant (see
Appendix.)
The second aspect is the comparison between
pruned and identifying SVC/SVM. In the first case,
the identifying SVC/SVM are likely to outperform the
pruned SVC/SVM if the sensitive attribute is a bad pre-
dictor of the class attribute in the original training data.
The sensitive attribute damages the shattering property
of the instances in the original training data and the in-
stances near the decision boundary are not on the sur-
face of a sphere. The pruned SVC/SVM estimates a
model of the original training data that is not likely to
generalize well. Figure 5 shows a bad predictor case,
because the average error rates of the identifying SVC
is less than the average error rates of the pruned SVC
when ` is 2 to 4. ` = 5 is a special case where the prun-
ing algorithm and `-diversity show the regularization ef-
fect to reduce the bias of the underfitting original SVC.
In the second case, the pruned SVC/SVM are likely
to outperform the identifying SVC/SVM if the sensi-
tive attribute is a good predictor of the class attribute
in the original training data. The symmetric shatter-
ing argument implicitly holds here. Figure 6 shows a
special case of a good predictor. The pruned SVC out-
performs the identifying SVC only for ` = 2. For `
values 3 to 5, the pruning algorithm and `-diversity act
like a poorly tuned regularizer that cause overfitting.
Unfortunately, we cannot know whether the sensitive
attribute is a good or bad predictor. Knowing such a
behavior would indicate the prediction of the sensitive
attribute, a defacto violation of `-diversity.
The third aspect is the comparison between the
pruned and the anonymized SVC/SVM. Figure 5
show the anonymized SVC/SVM in addition to the
anatomized and original SVC/SVM. The anatomized
SVC/SVM are expected to outperform the anonymized
SVC/SVM because anatomization preserves the orig-
inal values for all the attributes. The generalization
based k-anonymity, on the other hand, distorts most
of the original attribute values [15]. In Figure 5, the
average error rate of the pruned SVC is less than the
anonymized SVC’s when ` is 3 to 5. These results show
the advantage of anatomization versus generalization-
based k-anonymity. Anatomization has high data util-
ity while the sensitive attribute has a strong privacy
guarantee, unlike generalization-based k-anonymity.
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
We proposed a preprocessing algorithm for anatomiza-
tion. Our algorithm estimates a linearly separable train-
ing data from the anatomized training data. We defined
the generalization ability of support vector classifiers
when they are trained on the former preprocessed data.
The key point to remember is that our algorithm gives
good generalization guarantees to support vector classi-
fiers. The proposed mechanism is evaluated on multiple
publicly available datasets and accurate models were
observed in most cases while `-diversity is preserved.
There are multiple future directions for this work.
First is the development of other classification or clus-
tering algorithms for anatomization. Second is the ex-
tension of current work to the k-anonymity or general-
ization based `-diversity. Considering multiple sensitive
attributes is also another direction.
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APPENDIX
A Proof of Generalization Theorem
Theorem A.1. (4.1 in the main paper) Let N be the
number of instances, d be the number of identifying
attributes and d + 1 be the total number of attributes
in the original and pruned training data. Let R be the
radius of sphere containing the shatterable instances of
the original training data D and w be the weights of
the linear hyperplane resulting from linear SV classifier
trained on the original training data D. Let Rp and
wp be the symmetric notations for a linear SV classifier
trained on the pruned training data Dp. Assume that
all the training instances are located in an Euclidean
space Rd+1. Let || ∗ || be the Euclidean norm of vector
∗. Let r2 be (R||w||)2, r2p be (RP ||wp||)2, [r2p]min be
min{r2p} > 0 and [r2p]max be max{r2p} <∞. Let R̂N (f)
be the empirical risk of on the original training data D
and R̂Np(f) be the empirical risk on the pruned training
data. Let F be the functional space defining the set
of possible linear SV classifiers on the original training
data D and Fp be the functional space of possible linear
SV classifiers on the pruned training data DP . Let
f̂N be the empirical risk minimizer such that f̂N =
argmin
f∈F
R̂N (f) and f̂Np be the empirical risk minimizer
such that f̂Np = argmin
f∈Fp
R̂Np(f) Last, let inf
f∈F
R(f) be
the lowest value of the risk of the linear SV classifier f
that could be analytically calculated. Then, the expected
risk E[R(f̂Np)] of f̂Np converges to inf
f∈F
R(f) under the
upper bound
E[R(f̂Np)]− inf
f∈F
R(f) ≤ 4
√
(d+ 2)log(N + 1) + log2
N
+
[r2p]max − [r2p]min
N
(A.1)
using only DP .
Proof. From 3.4, we have
(A.2) E[R(f̂Np)] ≤
E[r2p]
N
Let  > 0 be the small change on r2 caused by DP such
that r2p = r
2 ±  holds. Using A.2, we have
E[R(f̂Np)] ≤
E[r2p]
N
=
E[r2]
N
± 
N
(A.3)
From 3.4, we also have R(f̂N ) ≤ E[r
2]
N . Using this in the
second line of A.3 results in
(A.4) E[R(f̂Np)] ≤ max{R(f̂N )} ±

N
Subtracting inf
f∈F
R(f) from both sides of A.4 gives A.5.
(A.5)
E[R(f̂Np)]− inf
f∈F
R(f) ≤ max{R(f̂N )} − inf
f∈F
R(f)± 
N
Using 3.5 in the right-hand side of A.5 and considering
the worst case of r2p = r
2 +  result in A.6
E[R(f̂Np)]− inf
f∈F
R(f) ≤ 4
√
(d+ 2)log(N + 1) + log2
N
+

N
(A.6)
Since both r2 and r2p is expected to exist in the interval
([r2p]min, [r
2
p]max) according to the algorithm in Figure
B.2 and the definition of maximum margin in the linear
SV classifier [5], 0 ≤  ≤ [r2p]max − [r2p]min holds. Using
 ≤ [r2p]max− [r2p]min in the right-hand side of A.6 gives
A.7.
E[R(f̂Np)]− inf
f∈F
R(f) ≤ 4
√
(d+ 2)log(N + 1) + log2
N
+
[r2p]max − [r2p]min
N
(A.7)
This concludes the proof of Theorem A.1.
B Pruning Mechanism Algorithm
Figures B.1 and B.2 give the pseudocodes of two steps
that are mentioned in Section 4.1.
computePrerequisites (𝐷𝐴): 
‖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛‖
2 ≔ +∞ //Squared norm of minimum potential radius 
‖𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥‖
2 ≔ −∞ //Squared norm of maximum potential radius 
𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑞𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 ≔ ∅ //List of squared norms  
for 𝑖 = 1 to |𝐷𝐴|: 
𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑞𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 ≔ 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑞𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚  ∪ ‖𝐷𝐴[𝑖]‖
2
  
if(‖𝐷𝐴[𝑖]‖
2
≤  ‖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛‖
2) then 
‖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛‖
2 ≔ ‖𝐷𝐴[𝑖]‖
2
 
if(‖𝐷𝐴[𝑖]‖
2
≥ ‖𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥‖
2) then 
‖𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥‖
2 ≔ ‖𝐷𝐴[𝑖]‖
2
 
//Estimate the expected squared radius from 𝑈[‖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛‖
2, ‖𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥‖
2] 
𝐸[‖𝑅‖2] ≔
‖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛‖
2 + ‖𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥‖
2
2
 
return (𝐸[‖𝑅‖2],𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑞𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚) 
Figure B.1: Prerequisite Step Pseudocode
pruneTrainingData (𝐷𝐴): 
(𝐸[‖𝑅‖2] , 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑞𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚) ≔ computePrerequisites (𝐷𝐴) 
𝐷𝑝 ≔  ∅ //List holding the pruning result  
𝑖 ≔ 0 //index for instances 
𝑗 ≔ 0 //index for visited groups 
while (𝑖 < |𝐷𝐴|): 
𝑑𝑐 ≔ +∞ //distance between the chosen instance in a group and 𝐸[‖𝑅‖
2] 
𝑔𝑐 ≔ +∞ //index of the instance in a group with distance 𝑑𝑐 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 ≔ |𝐺𝑗| //Total number of instances for all visited groups 
//Look for an instance closest to 𝐸[‖𝑅‖2] in the current group 
while (𝑖 < 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠):  
𝑑 ≔ |𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑞𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚[𝑖] − 𝐸[‖𝑅‖
2]| 
if(𝑑 < 𝑑𝑐) then //a closer instance to 𝐸[‖𝑅‖
2] 
𝑑𝑐 ≔ 𝑑 
𝑔𝑐 ≔ 𝑖 
𝑖 ≔ 𝑖 + 1 
𝐷𝑝 ≔ 𝐷𝑝  ∪ 𝐷𝐴[𝑔𝑐] 
if(𝑗 < |𝐺|) then //Update number of instances for the next visited group 
𝑗 ≔ 𝑗 + 1 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 ≔ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 + |𝐺𝑗| 
return 𝐷𝑝 
Figure B.2: Pruning Step Pseudocode
In the pseudocodes, the paramater DA signifies the
augmented anatomized training data. The augmenta-
tion here includes three points:
1. After the inner join operation between the IT and
ST tables (cf. Definition 11), the instances are
sorted with respect to the attribute GID; and then
the attributes IT.GID and ST.GID are dropped.
2. The mean of every numeric and non-numeric ordi-
nal attribute is substracted in the augmented anat-
omized training data. If the attribute Ai is non-
numeric ordinal, we replaced the non-numeric val-
ues with integer values 1 to |dom(Ai)| according
to domain-wise order and set mode of the discrete
values to be mean.
3. If the attribute Ai is non-numeric nominal, we
replaced the mode of Ai with integer 0 and the
rest of Ai values with integer 1.
Note that the pseudocodes use the squared norm
instead of the norm itself, because Theorem A.1 defines
the generalization error upper bound with the squared
radius of sphere containing the shatterable instances of
the original training data D.
The complexity of the algorithm in Figure B.2 is
O(N(d+2)). Note that although there are 2 while loops
in the algorithm, every instance is visited once and the
algorithm doesn’t go through d + 1 attributes due to
listsqNorm which makes the execution time of pruning
O(N). The prerequisites algorithm need to visit every
instance and dimension which makes the execution time
O(N(d+1)). So the total execution time is O(N(d+2)).
All the groups (G) and the total number of instances
within each group (Gj) of the anatomized training data
are assumed to be known. In case it is not known,
the grouping information can be computed using an
inner join operation and group by query on IT and ST
tables. Such a nested operation is easily implemented
in O(N logN) execution time.
C Analysis of Additional Results
C.1 Additional Datasets There are 2 more
datasets to describe.
Marketing Data: This data is drawn from a
phone based marketing campaign of a Portuguese bank-
ing institution for long term deposits [4]. We created the
following binary classification task which is linearly sep-
arable under a soft margin SVC: “among all the people
who didn’t submit a long term deposit, predict whether
a person has a housing loan or not”. We performed the
following preprocessing using Weka filters [30]: 1) pick
39922 instances who didn’t make a long term deposit
2) choose four attributes job, day, month and age us-
ing the correlation with the class attribute “housing”.
Discretized age is treated as sensitive attribute.
Fatality Data: This data is a U.S. National Cen-
ter for Statistics and Analysis compilation of 2001 car
accidents. The original class attribute has eight labels
indicating the level of injury suffered [3]. We created the
binary “Injured” and “No Injury” in the following way:
1) remove the instances with labels “Injured Severity -
Unknown”, “Died Prior to Accident”, “Unknown” and
“Possible Injury’ from the original data. This results in
91085 instances 2) label “Injured” the instances with la-
bels “Nonincapaciting Evident Injury”, “Incapaciting -
Injury” and “Fatal Injury”. No feature selection is
applied on this dataset. “POLICE REPORTED AL-
COHOL INVOLVEMENT” was treated as sensitive at-
tribute.
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Figure C.1: SVC on Adult
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Figure C.2: SVM on Adult
C.2 Analysis of Additional Results We will an-
alyze more results in this section. In Section 5, three
observation aspects were discussed for evaluation.
To recall, the first aspect was the comparison be-
tween the pruned and original SVC/SVM. From The-
orem A.1, we expect that the average error rates of
pruned SVC/SVM will be greater then the original
SVC/SVM’s if there is no suppression due to `-diversity
constraint. One exceptional case would be the regular-
ization effect where `-diversity and pruning algorithm
reduces either the bias of underfitting SVC/SVM or the
variance of overfitting SVC/SVM. Another exceptional
case would be the suppression of many instances of the
original training data due to `-diversity constraint. This
violates the assumption of Theorem A.1. The second
aspect is the comparison between pruned and identify-
ing SVC/SVM. From the shattering properties of the
statistical learning theory, the pruned SVC/SVM are
expected to outperfom the identifying SVC/SVM if the
sensitive attribute is a good predictor of the class at-
tribute. If sensitive attribute is, on the other hand,
a bad predictor of the class attribute; the opposite of
the former behaviour is expected to occur. Last, the
third aspect is the comparison between the pruned and
anonymized SVC/SVM. The pruned SVC/SVM are ex-
pected to outperform the anonymized SVC/SVM be-
cause anatomization preserves the original values for all
the attributes. Figures C.1 to C.8 show the results of all
the experiments. In all Figures, “Org.” and “Id.” labels
will stand for the original SVC/SVM and the identifying
SVC/SVM respectively. The pruned and anonymized
SVC/SVM will be represented by their respective pri-
vacy parameters (L for ` and k for k.)
Figure C.1 shows a surprising result of pruned SVC
in the first and second aspect. In the first aspect,
increasing ` reduces the average error rate of the pruned
SVC so `-diversity and pruning algorithm regularize
the underfitting original SVC. Theorem A.1 does not
hold as well for ` ≥ 4, because some original training
data instances are suppressed. In the second aspect,
the sensitive attribute is a bad predictor of the class
attribute. Identifying SVC performs better than many
pruned SVCs. In the third aspect, the average error
rate of pruned SVC is less than the average error rate
of anonymized SVC for all ` = k values (See Section
5.2).
Figure C.2 shows the expected results of pruned
SVM in all three aspects. Increasing ` result in the
increase of average error rate for pruned SVM and orig-
inal SVM outperforms the pruned SVM. The expecta-
tion from Theorem A.1 occurs here despite suppression
(violation of assumption). We believe that `-diversity
and pruning algorithm act as regularizer for SVMs with
RBF kernel which tend to overfit to the training data.
Notice that the sensitive attribute is a good predictor of
the class attribute in the infinite dimensional space since
average error rate of pruned SVM is less than the aver-
age error rate of identifying SVM. Last, the average er-
ror rate of the pruned SVM is less than the anonymized
SVM’s one by 0.1.
Figure C.3 shows in general the expected result of
pruned SVC in the first aspect. ` = 4 is a special case
where its average error rate is greater than the pruned
SVC’s that is trained on 5-diverse data. Theorem A.1’s
assumption is violated again when ` = 5 because some
original training data instances are suppressed. In the
second aspect, the pruned SVC cannot capture the good
shattering property that the sensitive attribute provide
in the original dimensional space.
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Figure C.3: SVC on IPUMS
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Figure C.4: SVM on IPUMS
Figure C.4 shows in general the expected result of
pruned SVM for first and second aspects. In the first
aspect, the pruned SVM outperforms the original SVM
when ` = 2. This shows that the pruning algorithm
and `-diversity has the regularization effect even if
the sensitive attribute is a good predictor according
to the second aspect. The regularization case could
occur in general, because it is statistically significant
for confidence interval 0.95 (See Table 2).
Figure C.5 show the expected behaviour of pruned
SVC in the first aspect. One thing to emphasize is
the surprising spike in the error rate distribution when
` = 5. The reason is that the original training data
satisfies the `-diversity condition when ` = 2 and
` = 3. When ` = 5, almost half of the training
instances are suppressed. This strongly violates the
assumption of Theorem A.1 and the result is also not
statistically significant (cf. Table 1). We should note
that the sensitive attribute is a bad predictor since the
average error rates of pruned SVC are greater than the
identifying SVC’s.
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Figure C.5: SVC on Marketing
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Figure C.6: SVM on Marketing
Figure C.6 show the expected behaviour of pruned
SVC in the first aspect. The pruned SVC also show
the expected result in the second aspect. The sensitive
attribute is not a good predictor in the infinite dimen-
sional space.
In Figure C.7, the pruned SVC gives an interest-
ing and surprising result in the first aspect. The aver-
age error rate of pruned SVC is approximately same as
the average error rate of original SVC for all ` values.
We believe that this would only occur in this dataset
because the results are not statistically significant (cf.
Table 1.) When ` = 3 and ` = 4, the assumption in
Theorem A.1 is violated because most of the training
instances are suppressed. In the second aspect, sensi-
tive attribute is bad (insignificant) predictor since the
pruned SVC thus does not reduce the error rate of the
identifying SVC.
Figure C.8 show the expected results of pruned
SVM in the first two aspects (despite violating the
assumption of Theorem A.1). In the second aspect,
note that the sensitive attribute is a bad predictor in
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Figure C.7: SVC on Fatality
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Figure C.8: SVM on Fatality
the inifinite dimensional space. The average error rate
of pruned SVM is greater than the identifying SVM’s.
C.3 Student t-test for Pruned SVC/SVM ver-
sus Original SVC/SVM Tables 1 and 2 give the sta-
tistical test results for confidence interval 0.95. In all
Tables, “P” stands for pass while “F” stands for fail.
“N/A” stands for not applicable in cases where the do-
main size of sensitive attribute is less than the ` value.
“Org.” stand for the original SVC/SVM whereas “`”
stand for the pruned SVC/SVM. Note that we do the
test for original SVC/SVM vs pruned SVC/SVM, be-
cause the Theorem A.1’s scope covers this analysis.
In Section C.2, we saw the theoretically expected
results for pruned SVC vs original SVC when they are
trained on IPUMS dataset (cf. Figure C.3). Table 1
shows that the difference between the pruned and origi-
nal SVC is statistically significant for almost all ` values.
We saw, in contrary, theoretically unexpected results in
case of pruned SVC vs. original SVC on adult and fatal-
ity datasets. Table 1 shows that the difference between
Dataset Org. vs Org. vs Org. vs Org. vs
`=2 `=3 `=4 `=5
Marketing P F F F
Fatality F F F N/A
IPUMS F P P P
Adult F F F F
Table 1: Pruned SVC vs Original SVC
the pruned and original SVC are statistically insignifi-
cant in adult and fatality datasets. So, the theoretically
unexpected results are likely to occur by just random
chance and it doesn’t make Theorem A.1 invalid. In
marketing dataset, the difference between the pruned
and the original SVC is statistically insignificant for `
values 3-to-5, because most of the training instances
were suppressed. Note that Theorem A.1 is valid if and
only if both the pruned and the original training dataset
have the same number of instances (no or negligeable
suppression.) (See Theorem A.1)
Dataset Org. vs Org. vs Org. vs Org. vs
`=2 `=3 `=4 `=5
Marketing P P P P
Fatality F P P N/A
IPUMS P P P P
Adult P P P P
Table 2: Pruned SVM vs Original SVM
Table 2 shows that the difference between pruned
SVM and original SVM are statistically significant in
almost all datasets for multiple ` values. In Section C.2,
the expectation from Theorem A.1 occured in all the
datasets. (cf. Figures C.2, C.4, C.6 and C.8) This good
result are therefore very unlikely to occur by random
chance and Theorem A.1 is valid in infinite dimensions.
This result is in parallel to Vapnik and Burges’ claim for
the original SVM when there is no suppression [29, 5].
Last, we observe surprisingly significant results when
the assumption of Theorem A.1 is violated. We believe
that the `-diversity and pruning acts as a regularizer
since SVMs with RBF kernel tend to overfit to the
training data.
In summary, we measured the statistically signifi-
cant error rates when the pruned SVC/SVM show the
expectation from Theorem A.1. The error rates were
statistically insignificant when they don’t respect the ex-
pected result of Theorem A.1 or when the pruned train-
ing data violates the assumption of Theorem A.1.
